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CONGLOMERATE-POWER MERGERS
I. TYPES OF MERGERS
Government's attacks on corporations which upset the ideal of economic
competition by controlling price rather than being guided by the "imper-
sonal" laws of supply and demand' are directed to a great extent in the
laws forbidding certain mergers. A merger entered into with intent to
monopolize or one which is in restraint of trade is subject to attack under
the Sherman Act;2 one which may substantially lessen competition or tend
to create a monopoly is subject to attack under section 7 of the Clayton
Act.'
Until the last decade the applicability of section 7 was limited to hori-
zontal mergers:' those in which the merging firms perform similar functions
1. The ideal is premised on a conviction that competition exists primarily when no
firm or group of firms can control prices in a given market. GALBRAITIr, AastmuoAN
CAPITALISm 7-14 (rev. ed. 1956). In United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374
U.S. 321 (1963), the Court notes with approval the statement in Comment, 68 YALE
L.J. 1627, 1638-39 (1959) that "competition is likely to be greatest when there are many
sellers, none of which has any significant market share." The Court added that this is
"common ground" among economists, and "was undoubtedly a premise of congressional
reasoning about the anti-merger statute." 374 U.S. at 636; accord, United States v.
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956); Scott Paper Co., 3 TRADE Ruo.
REP. 16706 (FTC 1964); Procter & Gamble Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 16673 (FTC
1963). See also Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Laws and Econom-
ics, 74 H-RDv. L. Rav. 226, 247 (1960); Walden, Antitrust in the Positive State, 41 Tex.
L. REv. 741, 763-64 (1963). In United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, supra, the
Court did not mention that the comment in the Yale Law Journal, in a footnote, indi-
cated the contrary views of those who advocate workable competition, by which the
market of a few sellers, although an oligopoly, may be the preferable form of competition
in certain industries. Comment, 68 YALE L.J. 1627, 1639 n.56 (1959).
2. Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1958). Sec-
tion 1 provides that "every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade . . . is declared to be illegal." Section 2 provides that
"every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce ...
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor."
3. Clayton Act § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1958). The pertinent section, as amended in 1950, forbids acquisition of
stock or assets of another corporation where the effect of such acquisition "in any line
of commerce in any section of the country ... may be substantially to lessen competition,
or to tend to create a monopoly."
4. Federal enforcement agencies originally thought that the statute covered only
horizontal mergers. See, e.g., FTC, REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS AND AcQUISTIONS
168 (1955). For a discussion of this erroneous position, see Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 313 (1962); United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
353 U.S. 586, 590 (1957).
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in the production or sale of comparable goods or services.5 Originally, ap-
plication of section 7 required (1) that the merging firms operate within
the same line of commerce6 and (2) that they compete in the same geo-
graphical market.7 The threat to competition in such a merger is clear.
Where firms in the same line of commerce in the same geographical market
merge, there is an immediate increase in the market share of the acquiring
firm.' In determining the validity of such a merger, the test applied is
whether the acquisition of new market shares will substantially lessen com-
petition.9
5. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 4, at 334.
6. "Line of commerce" is synonymous with "product market." United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp 576, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). In Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325-26 (1962), the Court said that the outer boundaries
of a product market are "determined by the reasonable interchangeability of use or the
cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and substitutes for it."
Within this broad market, there may also exist "sub-markets" which constitute product
markets for anti-trust purposes. The determination of sub-markets is made by examining
"such practical indicia as industry or public recognition of the sub-market as a separate
economic entity, the product's peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facili-
ties, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes and specialized ven-
dors." The Court added that "the boundaries of the relevant market must be drawn
with sufficient breadth to include the competing products of each of the merging com-
panies and to recognize competition where, in fact, competition exists." See United
States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 452-58 (1964).
7. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 357-62 (1963). "Sec-
tion of the country" in section 7 of the Clayton Act is described as referring to "where,
within the area of competitive overlap, the effect of the merger on competition will be
direct and immediate." Id. at 357; see United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376
U.S. 651 (1964).
The requirement of the same geographic market means that the horizontal aspects of
market-extension mergers (performing similar functions), defined in text accompanying
notes 17-18 infra, are not covered by section 7, since the merged firms are not in the
same geographical market.
8. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 322 n.38, 335, 342-43 (1962);
Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 823-24 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 937 (1962); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 588,
604 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Procter & Gamble Co., 3 TRADE REG. RnP. 1 16673, at 21565
(FTC 1963).
9. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 8, at 334-35 n.62. Among factors to
be considered are the amount of the market share, the nature of the companies and the
industry and the tendency toward concentration of market shares in a few firms. Id. at
343-46. Emphasis is on the "trend toward concentration, the tendency to monopolize,
before the consumer's alternatives disappeared through merger." United States v. Phila-
delphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 364 (1963).
A merger which produces "an undue percentage share of the relevant market, and
results in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in that market" will be
set aside in the "absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to
have such anti-competitive effects." Id. at 363-64; see A. G. Spalding & Bros., Inc. v.
FTC, 301 F.2d 585, 625-27 (3d Cir. 1962); American Sugar Crystal Co. v. United
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The limitation of section 7 to horizontal mergers has been removed. In
1950, the section was amended to bring all mergers within its scope.' ° In
1957 the Supreme Court held that the section, even before its amendment,
in fact had been intended to apply to other types of mergers." The merger
attacked in the 1957 decision was vertical-one between a customer and a
supplier.'2 Such a merger does not immediately affect the market share of
either firm's line of commerce, because they are not in competition with one
another. But it may provide the supplier with an unfair advantage, since
the customer firm will tend to purchase from the supplier firm rather than
from the latter's competitors." A vertical merger thus will "foreclose the
competition of either party from a segment of the market otherwise open
to them."'4
Both horizontal and vertical mergers pose clearly discernable threats to
competition. However, more subtle threats to competition have been recog-
nized since the expansion of section 7. These arise from mergers that
produce advantages peculiar to a diversified firm operating in several lines of
commerce or to a chain firm operating in several geographical markets. This
note will discuss the definition of these advantages as a threat to competition
under section 7 of the Clayton Act.
States, 259 F.2d 524, 527-28 (2d Cir. 1958); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
supra note 8, at 603-11; Inland Container Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 17012, at 22120
(FTC 196+) (initial decision of the hearing examiner).
10. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 8, at 317; United States v. Mary-
land & Va. Milk Producers Assn'n, 167 F. Supp. 799, 802 (D. C. Cir. 1958), afl'd in
part, 362 U.S. 458 (1960); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., supra note 8, at
583. A review of legislative history is given in Bok, supra note 1, at 233-38, and in
Handler and Robinson, A Decade of Administration of the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger
Act, 61 COLUM. L. Rnv. 629, 652-74 (1961).
11. In United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957), the
Court held that paragraph one of the original section 7 attacked three types of mer-
gers: those which would (1) "substantially lessen competition between the corporation
whose stock is so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition," (2) "restrain
such commerce in any section or community," and (3) "tend to create a monopoly of
any line of commerce." Types (2) and (3) would not be restricted to horizontal mergers.
Id. at 591-92.
12. Du Pont, a major manufacturer of finishes, had acquired 23 per cent of the stock
of General Motors, a major buyer of finishes. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co., supra note 11, at 602. The Court held that the merger allowed du Pont to use
its stock to "pry open the General Motors market to entrench itself as the primary sup-
plier of General Motors' requirements for automotive finishes and fabrics." Id. at 606.
13. Id. at 607; accord, A. G. Spalding & Bros., Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 585, 623-24
(3d Cir. 1962). In Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 229-30 (D.C. Cir.
1962), it is pointed out that a vertical merger may also provide the acquired firm access
to the "deep-pocket" of the acquiring firm.
14. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962); accord, United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
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A. Conglomerate-Power
"Conglomerate-power" is the term used in this note to describe the pos-
session of these advantages. It may result from a conglomerate merger-
one in which the merging firms do not compete in the same product line
and are not in a customer-supplier relationship. 5 A favorite example is the
acquisition by a New York butcher shop of a newspaper stand in San Fran-
cisco.
Actually, threats to competition from conglomerate mergers are relatively
rare." Conglomerate-power may also arise, however, as the result of two
types of mergers which are variants of the conventional horizontal merger.
One type is a merger between two companies which produce the same
product but sell in different geographic markets.' These are called market-
extension mergers; they are horizontal but their horizontal qualities do
not result in a conventional section 7 violation.' The other variant
which may create conglomerate-power is the merger of firms that utilize
similar processes in manufacturing, advertising and distributing their
respective products, but produce products in different lines of com-
merce. 9 These are called product-extension mergers; they are partly hori-
zontal because of the similarity of their manufacturing, advertising or dis-
tribution processes. These similarities do not produce a conventional section
7 violation because the merger does not directly increase the market share
15. It has also been described as an acquisition in which there is "no discernible rela-
tionship in the nature of business between the acquiring and acquired firms." I TR.AD
Rzo. REP. 1 4350 (1963).
16. See Bicks, Conglomerates and Diversification Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
2 ANTITRUST BULL. 175, 177-78 (1956).
17. See Foremost Dairies, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944, 1064 (1962).
18. See Transamerica v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 206 F.2d 163 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953); Foremost Dairies, Inc., supra note 17, at 1086;
Beatrice Foods Co., 3 TRADE REo. REP. 16831 at 21812 (FTC 1964) (initial decision
of the hearing examiner).
19. United States v. Continental Can Co., 217 F. Supp. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), rev'd
on other grounds, 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. Lever Bros. Co., 216 F. Supp.
887 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Procter & Gamble Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1 16673 (FTC 1963).
In Continental Can, the majority in the Supreme Court held that the products of the
two merged firms were in the same line of commerce because of inter-industry competi-
tion and hence the merger was horizontal. 378 U.S. at 457, 465. However, the dis-
senting opinion (Mr. Justice Harlan joined by Mr. Justice Stewart) felt that the
products were in different, although competing, lines of commerce; hence "an inquiry
into competitive effects in the actual lines of commerce involved" must be made to
determine "the impact of the merger in the two lines of commerce here involved." Id.
at 475. The lower court had made the same analysis as the Supreme Court dissent on
the line of commerce question and had described the merger as "conglomerate." 217 F.
Supp. at 785. The Supreme Court, however, has yet to use the term "conglomerate" to
describe a merger in a case before it.
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of firms in the same line of commerce."0 Conglomerate-power arises, how-
ever, from the accessibility to each firm of the other's resources; this in-
directly affects the market shares in each line of commerce.2
Thus three types of mergers may result in the creation of conglomerate-
power: the conglomerate merger, the market-extension merger and the
product-extension merger. The term "conglomerate-power merger" will be
used to describe all three.2
B. Indirect Effects of Conglomerate-Power
Conglomerate-power mergers differ from horizontal or vertical ones pri-
marily because their effect on competition is not immediate. This points up
the additional difficulty of establishing the conglomerate-power merger's
effect on competition in a line of commerce.2" Although this showing is
also necessary in cases involving horizontal and vertical mergers, it is seldom
an issue because the harm to competition is patent. For example, merger
of firms in the same line of commerce causes an immediate increase of the
market share to accrue to the merged firm. The means by which compe-
tition may be harmed from vertical mergers are similarly obvious. The Su-
20. Ekco Prods. Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 16879, at 21900 (FTC 1964). The term
"product-extension" is restricted to a merger in which the acquired product is similar
to already existing ones of the acquiring firm. Procter & Gamble, supra note 19, at
21565-66. When the product is not related, it is a conglomerate merger. Union Carbide
Corp., 59 F.T.C. 614, 658-59 (FTC 1961).
21. Market-extension and product-extension mergers are sometimes called conglomer-
ate mergers. More often, however, they are called "quasi-horizontal mergers," since there
is some integration of facilities. This note discusses the market-extension nlerger's con-
glomerate power which poses a threat to competition as distinguished from the increase
in market shares which poses the threat in a horizontal merger.
22. Other recent articles dealing with cases in this area generally use the term
"conglomerate merger," but with reservations warning of the semantic jungle. Clark,
Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 36 NOTRE DA,%ME LAW. 255
(1961); Day, Conglomerate Merger and the "Curse of Bigness," 42 N.C.L. RFv. 511
(1964); Note, Conglomerate Mergers: The Attack on Diversification, 25 U. Pir L. Rrv.
683 (1964); Note, The Consolidated Foods Case: A New Section 7 Test for the Con-
glomerate Merger, 49 VA. L. REV. 852 (1963).
"Conglomerate-power" is used in this note to describe the threats to competition which
arise from non-horizontal and non-vertical aspects of relations between merging firms.
It has been a factor in cases arising under the Sherman Act. United States v. Griffith,
334 U.S. 100, 107-08 (1947) (movie theatre chain will not put films in one-theatre
town unless given competitive advantage in multi-theatre towns) ; United States v. Swift
& Co., 286 U.S. 106, 116-17 (1931) (chain store balances off profits and losses to drive
out local competitors); United States v. Swift & Co., 189 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Ill.
1960), aff'd, 367 U.S. 909 (1961) (use of meat distribution channels for non-meat sales).
23. See Scott Paper Co. v. United States, 301 F.2d 579 (3rd Cir. 1962); Foremost
Dairies, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944, 1084 (1962); New Economic Issues in Merger Enforcement,
24 A.B.A. ANTI-TRuST SEC. 113, 136 (1964).
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preme Court has stated that "every extended vertical arrangement by its
very nature, for at least a time, denies to competitors of the supplier the
opportunity to compete for part or all of the trade of the customer party to
the vertical arrangement."2 Disputes involving horizontal or vertical merg-
ers generally focus on the factors of line of commerce and geographic area,
and on the question whether the merger will substantially lessen competi-
tion.:" However, these touchstones for violation of section 7 have no mean-
ing when considering the indirect effect on competition of a conglomerate-
power merger until a determination is made of the means by which it will
harm competition. This requires both an investigation of the industries in
which the merging firms operate and a detailed examination of the relation
between them to establish whether factors exist which may create an unfair
competitive advantage in a division of the merged firm, and therefore
threaten a lessening of competition in a line of commerce.26
Four problems, therefore, must be resolved in conglomerate-power merger
cases. First, the way in which a conglomerate-power merger might
affect competition in some product market must be shown. Second, the
line of commerce must be established. Third, the geographic limits of
the market must be defined. Fourth, the merger must be shown to cause a
"substantial lessening of competition." Steps two, three and four are factors
common to all merger cases, while step one is unique (as a matter of dis-
pute) to conglomerate-power merger cases.
Before the recent awakening to the anti-competitive potential of conglo-
merate-power mergers,2" concern over mergers was restricted to the effect
24. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962). Of course, the effect
on competition must be "substantial." United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F.
Supp. 545, 566 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
25. These are the three elements of section 7. See note 3 supra.
26. Reynolds Metals Co. v FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Scott Paper Co. v.
FTC, 301 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1962); United States v. FMC Corp., 218 F. Supp. 817
(N.D. Cal) (preliminary injunction denied), appeal dismissed, 321 F.2d 534 (3d Cir.),
aff'd, 84 Sup. Ct. 4 (1963) (Goldberg, J., opinion in chamber); United States v. Con-
tinental Can Co., 217 F. Supp. 761, 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 378
U.S. 441 (1964); Procter & Gamble Co., 3 TRADE REo. REP. 16673 (FTC 1963);
Foremost Dairies, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944, 1084 (1962); Hooker Chemical Corp., No. 8034,
FTC, Aug. 22, 1961 (consent order to cease and desist); National Tea Co., 3 TRADE
Rwo. REP. 16376 (FTC 1963) (initial decision of hearing examiner).
The Hooker consent order noted that there is no violation of Section 7 "when the
acquiring firm had contributed nothing of competitive consequence to the acquired firm
which would vary the competitive relationship between industry member, and the ac-
quiring firm's entrance into the industry had not affected market structure, market con-
trol or performance." For an early discussion of this necessity of proof, see Neal, The
Clayton Act and the Transamerica Case, 5 STAN. L. REv. 179, 188-91 (1952).
27. For the history of this awakening, see Blair, The Conglomerate Merger in Eco-
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of an immediate change in the market.2 This narrow view overlooked con-
glomerate-power mergers, which initially result in nothing more than the
substitution of one firm for another in a given market structure." They
cause no immediate increase in market shares. Indeed, such mergers may,
under some circumstances, increase competition. For example, a corpora-
tion with excess funds tends to invest in industries where profit rates are
high due to imperfect competition, thereby stimulating competition in that
industry." Or a large firm in one industry may acquire a smaller one in an
oligopolistic industry, cracking the lethargy of the dominating firms." Fur-
thermore, where intra-divisional buying and selling exists within a diversi-
fied firm, "transfer costs" are eliminated, permitting a reduction in prices
which in turn tends to stimulate competition. 2
A sophisticated analysis33 of actual business operations, however, revealA
that in many cases the long-range effect of a conglomerate-power merger is a
substantial lessening of competition. A 1962 report to the House of Repre-
sentatives recognized the unique effects of conglomerate-power mergers in
its statement that the economic impact was "often found in its side effects)
rather than in immediate repercussions."'" The report continued:
The conglomerate corporation... often has the advantages of horizon-
tal and vertical firms, and more. It can weather a storm of competi-
tion or emerging technical obsolesence in one of its areas of interest,
while seeking opportunities in other newly developing fields. It has
nomics and Law, 46 GEo. L. J. 672, 675-79 (1958). An important landmark was the
FTC REPORT ON THE MERGER MOVEMENT 59-63 (1948).
28. Procter & Gamble Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 16673 (FTC 1963); Bicks, supra
note 16, at 177-78 (1956); Neal, supra note 26, at 188-91 (1952).
29. United States v. Continental Can Co., 217 F. Supp. 761, 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1963),
rev'd on other grounds, 378 U.S. 441 (1964); Ekco Prods. Co., 3 TRADE Rmo. Rv P.
16879, at 21900 (FTC 1964); Union Carbide Corp., 59 F.T.C. 614, 659 (1961);
Hooker Chemical Corp., No. 8034, FTC, Aug. 22 1961 (consent order to cease and de-
sist).
30. Blake, Mergers and United States Antitrust Law, INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. SuPp.
PUEL. No. 6, at 91 (1963).
31. United States v. Lever Bros. Co., 216 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); see
Consolidated Foods Corp., No. 7000, FTC, Nov. 15, 1962, rev'd on other grounds, 329
F.2d 623 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 412 (1964) (No. 422); Blair, supra note
27, at 691-92; Bicks, supra note 16, at 185.
32. MASON, EcoNoMIc CONCENTRATION & THE MONOPOLY PROBLEm 22 (1957).
33. For a discussion of the significance of examining actual business operations rather
than merely market shares, see New Economic Issues in Merger Enforcement, 24 A.B.A.
ANTI-TRuST SEC. 113 (1964).
34. STAFF OF SELECT COmmITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS, H.R., 87TH CONG., 2D Snss.,
MERGERS AND SUPERCONCENTRATION, ACQUISITION OF 500 LARGEST INDUSTRIAL AND 50
LARGEST MERCHANDISING FIRMS 44 (Comm. Print 1962) [hereinafter cited as MEROSia
AND SUPERCONCENTRATION].
Washington University Open Scholarship
CONGLOMERATE MERGERS
staying power, ready access to the capital markets, accessibility to new
Government research and development grants, and supply contract
awards. 5
The report emphasized the increasing impact that the conglomerate or di-
versified firm will have on the economy, and depicted the "pervasive rise of
the conglomerate corporation" as the "new challenge to small business."3
II. ASPECTS OF CONGLOMERATE-POWER
A. Reciprocal Buying Practices
One aspect of conglomerate-power is the leverage obtained in indirect
reciprocal buying. Direct reciprocal buying is utilized in a vertically inte-
grated firm when one division sells to another at reduced prices; this is one
reason why the vertical merger can constitute a major threat to competi-
tion." Indirect reciprocal buying, however, is also a threat where an indi-
rect customer-supplier relationship exists within the diversified firm. This
may be the result of a conglomerate merger.
The basic situation arises when firm A acquires B and C is a supplier of
B and a customer of A. Finns A and B are in neither a vertical nor a
horizontal relationship. Nevertheless, A may put pressure on C to buy more
than he normally would from A through threats of depriving C of B as a
customer.3" This result is also possible without express pressure, because C
may increase its purchases from A simply to maintain the latter's good will.
The FTC has stated that the existence of these influences strikes at the basic
premise of the competitive ideal:
It distorts the focus of the trader by interposing between him and the
traditional factors of price, quality and service an irrelevant and alien
factor which is destructive of fair and free competition on the basis of
merit. The efficient producer may thereby suffer loss because of a
circumstance extrinsic to the worth of its product. In this situation,
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.; see Address by Willard E. Mueller, Chief Economist of the FTC, Faculty
Seminar of the College of Business Administration, University of Florida, 5 TRAE Rao.
RaP. 50191 (1963).
37. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957); Reynolds
Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Scott Paper Co. v. FTC, 301
F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1962).
38. Such overt threats have been held to be unfair methods of competition under sec-
tion 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914) (now 15
U.S.C. § 45 (a) (1958)). See California Packing Corp., 25 F.T.C. 379 (1937); Me-
chanical Mfg. Co., 16 F.T.C. 67 (1932); Waugh Equip. Co., 15 F.T.C. 232 (1931);
Krash, The Legality of Reciprocity Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 9 ANTITRUST
BULL. 93, 98-99 (1964).
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it is the relative size and conglomerate power of business rivals, rather
than economic efficiency, that may determine firm growth and suc-
cess and ultimately, the allocation of resources."
Two cases, United States v. Ingersoll-Rand" and Consolidated Foods
Corp. v. FTC,41 both involving conglomerate mergers, have considered re-
ciprocal buying leverage. In each, the three-way pressure illustrated above
existed, and both the threat to competition and the applicability of section
7 was recognized.'
In the first case the acquiring firm, Ingersoll-Rand, was a manufacturer
of general industrial machinery. It merged with several firms manufactur-
ing coal mining machinery, whose customers included steel mills owning
their own coal mines (captive mines). These steel companies were, of
course, interested in selling steel to Ingersoll-Rand for its use in the manu-
facture of general industrial machinery. Thus the steel mills became a cus-
tomer of one division of the diversified firm and a supplier of another. The
court noted that the steel mills would be aware of their dual relationship
with the diversified firm and that they would tend to purchase coal-min-
ing machinery from Ingersoll-Rand's newly-acquired divisions in order to
increase their steel sales to the manufacturing divisions."3 If the steel mills
should overlook their opportunity, the court continued, Ingersoll-Rand
could remind them of it by "judicious use of its [Ingersoll-Rand's] steel-
purchasing power." 4
39. Consolidated Foods Corp., No. 7000, FTC, Nov. 15, 1962, reo'd on other grounds,
329 F.2d 623 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 412 (1964) (No. 422). This is cited
with approval in United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. Pa.),
interlocutory injunction aff'd, 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963).
40. 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963) (hearing on interlocutory injunction). The district
court opinion, supra note 39, contains a more extended discussion of reciprocal buying.
41. 329 F.2d 623 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 412 (1964) (No. 422), revers-
ing No. 7000, FTC, Nov. 15, 1962. The Seventh Circuit reversed because post-acquisition
evidence showed that the predicted results did not, in fact, occur.
A third case is given in a complaint filed against the Electron-Motive Division of the
General Motors Corporation by the justice Department. General Motors acquisition of
80 per cent of the new and used locomotive market, the complaint charged, was helped
by other divisions of General Motors giving preference for the shipment of freight to
railroads which purchased General Motors locomotives. Thus the railroads would tend
to purchase a particular type of locomotive in order to keep the good will of General
Motors. General Motors Corp., 3 TRADE REG. RBP. 1 45063 (1963) (digested com-
plaint).
42. "Acquisitions may contravene the provisions of Section 7 if they result in the
creation of relationships between the resulting company and its customers and suppliers
which may bring about competitive advantages to the merging companies detrimental to
competition." United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530, 552 (W.D. Pa.),
interlocutory injunction aff'd, 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963).
43. United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509, 524 (3d Cir. 1963).
44. Ibid.
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In Consolidated Foods Corp. v. FTC,45 a similar relationship existed.
Consolidated Foods was the nation's largest food producer, and a customer
of food processors to whom Gentry Foods, the acquired firm, sold de-
hydrated onion and garlic. This made the food processors customers of
one division of the diversified firm and suppliers of another. The FTC
noted that these processors would, "to say the least, consider Gentry's con-
nection with Consolidated in selecting a course of supply of onion and
garlic."4 6
The danger to competition was compounded by the oligopolistic nature
of the dehydrated onion and garlic industry. Gentry and one other firm,
Basic Vegetable Products, together dominated between eighty and ninety
percent of both markets. Any balance between the two firms might be up-
set if Gentry were given the advantage of the merger with Consolidated.7
Apart from this, the remaining small firms in the market would face a par-
ticularly precarious future as a result of the merger, since it is the custom of
the buyers in the food processing industry to have two suppliers. Those who
did retain Basic Vegetable Products as a prime source of supply and had
one of the smaller firms as a secondary source would now tend to substitute
Gentry as their secondary source.
The merger was struck down by the FTC. On appeal, the Seventh
Circuit noted that the basic analysis of the FTC was consistent with section
7 principles: "business reciprocity has the effect of substantially lessening
competition or can be so utilized.""8 However, by the time the case reached
the Seventh Circuit the predicted results had not occurred. Gentry had
lost in shares of the garlic market (down twelve percent) and had gained
only slightly in shares in the onion market (up seven percent). This was
fatal to the case; the FTC was overruled and the merger allowed. The
Seventh Circuit's holding that "the experience reflected by ... [the] post-
acquisition period must weigh heavily in appraising future probabilities,""
indicates that other elements might offset the advantages predicted to result
from reciprocal buying opportunities. For example, in the Consolidated
Foods case the food processors' decision to buy onion and garlic was in-
fluenced more by factors such as "quality, better service, a need for an
additional source of supply, and type of containers furnished,""0 than by the
threatened loss of their finished product sales to Consolidated Foods. This
45. 329 F.2d 623 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 412 (1964) (No. 422).
46. Consolidated Foods Corp., No. 7000, FTC, Nov. 15, 1962, rev'd on other grounds,
329 F.2d 623 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 412 (1964) (No. 422).
47. Ibid. This was recognition of the effectiveness of oligopolistic competition.
48. 329 F.2d 623, 626 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 412 (1964) (No. 422).
49. Ibid.
50. Id. at 626.
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is particularly true in the case of nationally advertised brands, "which
through consumer acceptance and loyalty would be relatively immune
from... [Consolidated's] dictation of the source from which ingredients
must be obtained." 1 In other words, Consolidated was more at the mercy
of its large suppliers than in a position of dominance. Reciprocity is
clearly more effective with small suppliers.
The court's analysis of the actual market effects poses the further question
whether diversified corporations actually take advantage of reciprocal buy-
ing opportunities. It has been contended that they do not. The argument
made is that in large diversified corporations division managers may have
limited face-to-face contact and they may know little of another division's
business practices and needs. 2 Nevertheless, intra-corporate communica-
tion systems can be established to ensure exploitation of reciprocal buying
opportunities. For example, following the vertical merger between du Pont
and General Motors, a company policy was established requiring purchas-
ing agents of General Motors to check the availability of necessary supplies
from du Pont before reaching a buying decision."
B. Advertising and Marketing Advantages
With the rise of a mass-market for consumer goods and the development
of extensive communication facilities, a new element has been introduced
into the businessman's kit of competitive tools: persuasive advertising. Com-
bined with modem marketing and packaging techniques, it has drastically
affected the consumer's selection of a particular item from the array of-
fered by competing sellers. Rather than the differences between products--
price, quality, service, durability or convenience-the buyer's choice is more
often influenced by packaging and advertising techniques.' The increased
51. Id. at 627. Thus, wholesalers to whom Consolidated sells will demand certain
brands made popular by advertising. The manufactures of these brand products could
answer Consolidated's demand that more onion and garlic be bought from Gentry by
threatening to utilize another marketing firm to distribute their products to wholesalers.
52. Blake, supra note 30, at 89. This is particularly true because of the "recent trend
toward substantial autonomy of operating divisions."
53. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 603-05 (1957).
54. "The housewife purchases the brand that she sees displayed prominently on the
shelf or that is familiar and attractive to her by reason of advertising or sales promo.
tions." Procter & Gamble Co., 3 TADE REo. REP. 16673, at 21563 (FTC 1963), Citng
United States v. Lever Bros. Co., 216 F. Supp. 887, 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
The nature of large-scale advertising generates a great deal of debate. Some contend
it is a xecognition that the consumer is "sovereign"; others charge that the consumer is
constantly being "duped." A review of the attitudes is given in SUToN, HARRIs, KAYFSEN
& TOniN, THE AMERICAN BUSINEss CREED 138-60 (Schocken ed. 1962) (originally
published, 1956). Perhaps the consumer is both sovereign and duped.
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significance of advertising largely results from the increased importance of
"pre-selling" a product. In today's self-service supermarket, the personal
advice of the friendly merchant has been replaced by advertising and
packaging techniques geared to sell the product before the consumer enters
the store." In this sales atmosphere, the allegiance of the housewife tends to
be ephemeral and subject to change by pin-pointed advertising campaigns.
In many markets, the result is that competition between advertising and
packaging experts replaces that between producers.'6 Furthermore, the close
relation between advertising and sales success threatens the beneficial aspects
of competition for the consumer."7 When advertising becomes a dominant
factor in a product market, the large firm has an inherent advantage be-
cause of the enormous cost of large scale advertising." "Victory in some
forms of non-price competition may go not to the firm with the lower costs
or the best product, but to the company which can spend the most on adver-
tising, sales promotion, model changes, etc.""9 The result will not necessarily
be a better product for the consumer, but rather a constant shifting of
brands by the consumer as advertising proficiency in various products waxes
and wanes. With the cost of advertising falling eventually on the consumer,
the end result is higher prices for all products."0
55. See United States v. Lever Bros. Co., supra note 54, at 893; Procter & Gamble
Co., supra note 54, at 21563. Thus, there is a decentralizing of the buying decision, with
the consumer rather than the merchant making the effective buying choice. Hence the
problem exists of what actually determines the consumer's choice: his careful buying
habits or his suspectibility to mass advertising.
56. Procter & Gamble Co., supra note 54, at 21586 (FTC 1963). Decline in price
competition may bring other types to the fore, such as advertising, sales technique and
product development. Barnes, Primacy of Competition and the Brown Shoe Decision, 51
GEo. L.J. 706, 716 (1963). The author applied the term "non-price competition" to
such practices as advertising, artificial product differentiation, misrepresentation and
packaging, stating that such competition is largely concerned with "switching sales from
one supplier to another without giving the consumers any greater advantage in price,
quality or service."
57. Procter & Gamble Co., supra note 54, at 21586. "Advertising performs a socially
and economically useful function insofar as it educates the consumer to the broad range
of product alternatives . . .but this process is distorted in the case of a homogeneous
product.., produced under conditions of oligopoly...."
58. Procter & Gamble Co., supra note 54, at 21586; see General Foods Corp., 3
TRADE REG. REP. 16612 (FTC 1963) (complaint). For a discussion of the benefits of
a conglomerate-power merger for advertising in a "product discrimination" field, see
Blair, supra note 27, at 687. The large fund available for advertising new product B
will have come from the success of established product A. Thus competition in B's market
is distorted.
59. Address by Senator Phillip Hart (Chairman of the Anti-Trust and Monopoly
Subcommittee), Fourth Annual West Side Conference, Feb. 1, 1964, 5 TRADE REG. REP.
50224 (1964).
60. Procter & Gamble Co., 3 TRE REG. REP. 16673, at 21569 (FTC 1963).
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That a substantial lessening of competition may result from the use of
these advantages is particularly evident in product-extension and market-
extension mergers. A large company may acquire a small firm competing
with other small firms in a market similar (but not the same as) that of
the acquiring firm. Similarly, a chain store may acquire a retail outlet com-
peting with other small retail outlets in one local market. In each case
where the large firm's experienced and well financed advertising team is
made available to the smaller acquired firm, the smaller firm is enabled to
boost its market share at the expense of its competitors.
1. Firms Producing Similar and Dissimilar Products
Two situations are possible in the acquisition of a firm producing a dif-
ferent product. It may be a similar product (product-extension merger) or
a dissimilar product (conglomerate merger). When a large acquiring firm
produces a product similar to that of the small acquired firm, the advertising
facilities of the larger may be utilized for the benefit of the smaller firm and
thereby substantially threaten competition in the acquired firm's market.
An example is the case of Procter & Gamble Co. 01 In this case, the ac-
quired firm, Clorox, was the largest firm in the household bleach market
with sales of forty million dollars. Procter and Gamble, the acquiring firm,
had sales of over one billion dollars. Since a product such as bleach is com-
plementary to other household cleansers produced by Procter and Gamble,
extensive integration of advertising could readily have been achieved by
their experienced advertising team.2 The economies of large scale advertis-
ing in national news and broadcasting media were made more available to
Clorox than to its smaller rivals." In addition, the large diversified firm
could obtain local advertising tie-ins for Clorox.' Finally, established con-
sumer preference for Procter and Gamble's products would naturally extend
to any new product which it marketed. The benefits thus gained could
drive the smaller firms from the market.
However, when the acquired firm produces a product dissimilar to that
of the parent, a different situation is presented. There would not be a com-
plete and harmonious integration of advertising facilities, although the par-
61. Ibid.
62. Id. at 21582-86, 21572.
63. Id. at 21563; United States v. Lever Bros. Co., 216 F. Supp. 887, 899 (S.D.N.Y.
1963). Another advantage is advertising discounts for large volume. Procter & Gamble
Co., 3 TADE REo. REP. 16673, at 21576-77.
64. Id. at 21563; see General Foods Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 16612 (FTC 1963)
(complaint).
65. Procter & Gamble Co., 3 TRADE REO. REP. 1 16673, at 21579.
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ent firm's extensive financial resources could be channeled into the acquired
firm's advertising budget as part of a general financing program." Because
of the product dissimilarity, there is a natural inhibition to the application of
conglomerate-power. A portion of the decision in Union Carbide Corp.6"
may have been based on these considerations. The acquired firm manu-
factured sausage-casings, a product which bore no relation to any products
marketed by the acquiring firm. The merger was permitted in this case be-
cause it was not shown in what manner competition could be adversly af-
fected.6"
In some situations, advertising advantages transferred to an acquired
firm may result in a stimulus, rather than a deterrent, to competition. A
comparison of Procter & Gamble with United States v. Lever Bros. Co., 9
illustrates this possibility. In Procter & Gamble, where the market in which
the acquired firm participated was composed of firms much smaller than
Procter and Gamble, merger produced an industry in which the new firm
had immensely larger resources than its competitors. However, in Lever
Bros. Co. the acquired firm, operating in the low-sudsing, heavy-detergent
market, was, before the merger, competing at a disadvantage with large
diversified firms experienced in advertising and marketing household cleans-
ing agents."0 The merger with Lever Brothers was permitted because the
acquired firm otherwise would have remained at a hopeless competitive dis-
advantage with its two rivals. Thus a significant factor in these cases is a
determination of whether the market structure of the acquired firm is
principally one of large firms or small firms; new conglomerate-power might
not tend to adversely affect competition in an existing oligopolistic market.7 "
66. Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Ekco Prods. Co.,
3 TRADE REG. REP. ff 16956, at 22017 (FTC 1964).
67. 59 F.T.C. 614 (1961).
68. Id. at 658-59. Since the product was an industrial one, it may be that the pos-
sibilities open in consumer advertising did not exist in this case.
69. 216 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
70. Id. at 895-96. Before the acquisition, the acquired firm was a division of a large
chemical corporation with no experience in marketing and advertising household
cleansing agents. The acquired firm's two rivals manufactured a full line of such agents,
as did Lever Brothers.
71. See note 31 supra. On the other hand, a conglomerate firm may have greater re-
sources for the non-price competition often engaged in by oligopolistic firms. It would
also cause additional harm to whatever small firms remained in the predominently oligo-
polistic industry. See Blair, supra note 31, at 692-93.
For example, suppose that firms A, B and C dominate an industry, each possessing one
hundred units of resources. Also in the industry are firms D and E, with five units of
resources each. Firm F, possessing 1000 units of resources, acquires firm C. Now firm C
may draw on F's resources to compete with A and B in non-price competition and to
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2. Firms in a Different Geographic Market
Conglomerate-power exercised through advertising may also be a factor
in market-extension mergers. The merger might permit the newly acquired
firm to employ more television or periodical advertising than its local com-
petitors.72 Furthermore, at the final portion of nationally televised com-
mercials by the conglomerate, the name of the local outlet may be men-
tioned through agreements with the local television station. And where the
chain store has previously been broadcasting in the acquired firm's locality,
because of network commitment, it incurs little increase in costs,"3 just as
the parent firm's advertising department can create additional copies of its
standard promotional materials at little added expense. These advantages
are not available to the firm's one-market competitors.
C. Marketing Advantages
Market-extension and product-extension mergers may also produce
marketing advantages. Just as these mergers permit integration of advertis-
ing facilities, so they also allow an integration of marketing facilities. For
product-extension manufacturers there is a spreading of sales-force costs
over several items: one salesman sells several products for the diversified
firm, while salesmen for a one-line manufacturer are able to sell only one
product at each stop.74
The fight for shelf space is also tipped in favor of the diversified and
chain operation. With the multitude of presently existing products, a re-
tailer must sometimes limit the number of competing brands which he places
on his shelves. Multi-product manufacturers or wholesaling firms may
force less popular items upon a retailer by threatening to withdraw estab-
lished lines.7' A one-line producer is not able to do this.
compete with D and E in price competition. Whether F will be willing to allocate such
a large amount of its resources to firm C is a separate question.
72. Procter & Gamble Co., 3 TRADE REo. REP. 16673, at 21562-64 (FTC 1963). A
particularly damaging piece of evidence is given in Foremost Dairies, Inc., 60 F.T.C.
944, 1080-81 (1962). Respondent's 1953 corporate report stated that acquisitions of
firms in other geographic markets would protect it from local market declines and en-
able more effective national advertising.
73. Beatrice Foods Co., 3 TRADE REo. REP. 16831, at 21811 (FTC 1964) (initial
decision of hearing examiner).
74. Procter & Gamble Co., 3 TRADE REo. REP. 16673, at 21585 (FTC 1963); see
Hale, Diversification: Impact of Monopoly Policy Upon Multi-Product Firms, 98 U. PA.
L. Rnv., 320, 331-32 (1949). This advantage was a factor in the Sherman Act proceed-
ing in United States v. Swift & Co., 189 F. Supp. 885, 912 (N.D. Ill. 1960). For a criti-
cism of the alleged cost savings analysis, see Blair, supra note 31, at 680-81.
75. Procter & Gamble Co., supra note 74; see General Foods Corp., 3 TRADE Rro.
REP. 16612 (FTC 1963) (complaint); Neal, supra note 26, at 189.
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D. Balancing of Profits and Losses
The diversified firm enjoys further advantages in its computation of
profits and losses since the ultimate figures of its profit-and-loss statement
reflect the aggregate sum of its activity as a single entity. A losing division
or branch may therefore be sustained for several years without harm to the
entire firm's profit image."0 The one-line competitor, however, must show
consistent profits within a reasonable period of time or suffer extinction. A
loss statement for even one year might cause serious consequences in relation
to the one-line firm's credit rating, stock prices, personnel drawing potential
and the image it seeks to project in the business community. Thus where
one division of a diversified firm competes with a one-line firm, their long-
range outlooks are inherently different. While the former is able to with-
stand short-term losses to acquire long-term advantages, the latter is not."7
These advantages, made available by the inherent structures of the com-
peting firms, may also lead to further leverage in favor of the diversified
firm. The diversified firm may finance research and expansion activities
(with finances heretofore unavailable to the acquired firm) to obtain, for in-
stance, new machinery. The smaller firm may operate on a profit margin
too narrow to acquire the new machinery. 8 The diversified firm can also
advantageously transfer personnel, and make available existing facilities and
trade contacts, with the expense allocated to other divisions.79 The net ef-
fect is that the diversified division will be able to lower costs and undercut
the small firm, with the ultimate aim of acquiring a monopoly position in
which prices may be raised.8 These considerations are part of the "deep
pocket" rule noted in some vertical merger cases."' But mere existence of
the "deep pocket" is insufficient to constitute a section 7 violation for a
76. Procter & Gamble, supra note 74, at 21578, 21583; see Barnes, Comparative
Mores and Legal Tests in Merger Tests: The DuPont General Motors Decision, 46 GEo.
L.J. 564, 585 (1958); Blair, supra note 31, at 681-82. Because of accounting difficulties,
such as allocating overhead costs, this may be done unwittingly and to the harm of the
diversified firm. See Hale, supra note 74, at 359-61.
77. Foremost Dairies, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944, 1059, 1072, 1083-84 (1962).
78. It should be noted that much of contemporary business expansion is financed by
retained earnings, rather than by borrowing in the capital market. See Berle, Property,
Production and Revolution, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 8 (1965) (retained earnings used for
approximately 60 per cent of expansion in 1964); EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COMPETITION
145 n.84 (1949) (retained profits used for 57 per cent of expansion in 1947).
79. See United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530, 543 (W.D. Pa.), in-
terlocutory injunction aff'd, 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963).
80. Foremost Dairies, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944, 1059, 1072, 1083-84 (1962). For a Sher-
man Act violation, see United States v. New York Great A. & P. Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79,
86-88 (7th Cir. 1949). Situations other than diversification may give rise to price-cut-
ting, however. Hale, supra note 74, at 349.
81. E.g., Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 229-30 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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conglomerate-power merger; a showing of ways in which the "deep pocket"
could be utilized for the benefit of the small acquired firm is necessary."s
In product-extension and market-extension mergers, particular means
exist by which the balance of profits and losses made possible by the "deep
pocket" may be utilized. For example, a chain with stores in separate geo-
graphic markets may temporarily lower prices in one market, driving the
weaker one-market firm to the wall, while financing the loss with profits
derived from stores in other parts of the chain. 3 This is not possible when
several chains compete in a local area, although this gives rise to a new
problem: the tendency may be for each chain to avoid economically sound
price-cutting in one market for fear of retaliation in other markets.'
While the discrimination in prices, if put into effect, may be a violation of
the Robinson-Patman Act,"5 a successful attack under section 7 prevents
formation of the market structure which would entice such discriminations."0
The attack is two steps removed from the offense. The merger may cause
price discrimination; the price discrimination may cause harm to competi-
tion. 7
In any merger whereby a firm in a different product-line is acquired,
the financial "deep pocket" is make available to the acquired product.88 In
a product-extension merger, other advantages are also made possible. For
example, where advertising is an important competitive factor, the "deep
pocket" may subsidize crash advertising programs to sway consumer tastes.Y'
The parent firm's advertising team, when used for the new product, may be
charged off on the balance sheet against existing products; in any event, the
0
82. Id. at 230; Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 206
F.2d 163, 169 (3d Cir. 1953); Ekco Prods. Co., 3 TRA E REG. REP. 1 16879, at 21900
(FTC 1964); Procter & Gamble Co., 3 TRaE REP. 16673 (FTC 1963); Foremost
Dairies, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944 (1962); Union Carbide Corp., 59 F.T.C. 614, 658 (1961).
83. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1958);
Foremost Dairies, Inc., supra note 82, at 1059, 1081-82 (1962). For a Sherman Act pro.
ceeding, see United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 116-17 (1932).
84. See Barnes, supra note 76, at 586. Thus, the tendency of prices to seek their
market level in each area is inhibited. An artificial upward push on prices in all areas
.ill result.
85. 49 Stat. 1526, 1528 (1936), amending 38 Stat. 730 § 2 (1914) (now 15 U.S.C.
§§ 13-13b, 21a (1958)).
86. The same holds true in a Sherman Act proceeding. See United States v. New
York Great A. & P. Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79, 88 (7th Cir. 1949).
87. For a criticism of this double possibility, see Day, Conglomerate Mergers and the
Curse of Bigness, 42 N.C.L. Rev. 511, 550-51 (1964).
88. Ekco Prods. Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 16879, at 21907 (FTC 1964); Procter
& Gamble Co., 3 TaDE REG. REP. 16673, at 21583 (FTC 1963); see Blair, supra note
31, at 687.
89. Procter & Gamble Co., supra note 88, at 21564.
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acquired firm is given access to expertise not available to its small competi-
tors.9"
With market-extension and product-extension mergers, then, the balanc-
ing of profits and losses which any diversified firm may employ is more ef-
fectively employed. Thus, showing the marketing and advertising ad-
vantages may be sufficient as a showing of the particular utilization of the
"deep pocket" which could "substantially" harm competition.9
III. COMPETITION AND CONCENTRATION
Three consequences result from a conglomerate-power merger: (1) com-
petitive advantages are made available to the acquired firm which allow it
to increase market shares in a manner incompatible with the competitive
model; (2) this increase in market shares comes at the expense of the ac-
quired firm's competitors; (3) in turn, market shares are concentrated in
a few large firms, which, with a combination of conglomerate-power and
conventional oligopolistic power, can drive small businesses from the market.
A. Competition
In the competitive model it is assumed that two results occur simultane-
ously: (1) the buyer receives the products he desires, and (2) sellers satis-
fying these desires will prosper."' Buyer demand elicits seller response, which
in turn assures satisfaction of buyer demand. Absent unusual circumstances,
the system is self-operating and benefits both the seller and buyer. Indeed,
this simultaneous benefit to both sides of a business transaction is considered
the ultimate justification of the competitive system. As the Court in
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States said:
[The Enforcement of the anti-trust laws] rests on the premise that the
unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best alloca-
tion of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality
and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing
an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic and
social institutions.93
90. Id. at 21578.
91. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
92. See Adams & Durlam, Brown Shoe: In Step With Anti-Trust, 1963 WASH.
U.L.Q. 158, 160-61; Barnes, The Primacy of Competition and the Brown Shoe Decision,
51 GEo. L.J. 706, 716-17 (1963) ; The Role of the Economist in Merger Cases, 3 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 501, 507 (1958). That is, the same competitive system which rewards effi-
cient producers benefits the consumer. GALBRATH, AMERCAN CAPITALISM 19 (rev. ed.
1956). For a discussion of the popular conception of this theory, see SUTTON, HARRS,
KAYSEN & TOBIN, op. cit. supra note 54, at 161-83.
93. 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
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The Supreme Court also has stated that the competitive system demands,
wherever possible, that an increase in market share result from internal ex-
pansion-by enticing away customers of competitiors.9" A firm does this
by offering better wares for a lower price. The two favorable consequences
of the self-operating competitive system occur when a firm increases its share
of the market by internal expansion. First, customers continually receive
better bargains because of the pressure of each firm to expand its sales.
Second, since each firm seeks to produce more efficiently in order to pro-
vide better bargains, there is a continual improvement in the efficiency of
the entire economy. External expansion-securing an increase in market
shares by acquiring competitors and thus their customers-does not pro-
vide this dual benefit.
Following a conglomerate-power merger, the newly-acquired firm (now
a division of the conglomerate firm) increases its market share in a manner
that satisfies part of the goal of fostering internal expansion. It entices
away customers of competitors rather than acquiring them through merger
(as does an acquiring firm in a horizontal merger)."; But it does this not
by offering better wares or by producing more efficiently. Rather, it at-
tracts customers and increases its share of the market by virtue of com-
petitive advantages unrelated to efficiency of production; that is, by the use
of reciprocal buying, excessive advertising, or the balancing of profits and
losses among markets. The division of the conglomerate firm benefiting
from the exercise of conglomerate-power thus attracts customers which it
would not have if it were forced to rely on the attractiveness of the product
itself. Further, in reciprocal buying and excessive advertising cases, the
customer does not benefit by receiving a better product at a better price;
other considerations lead him to purchase the conglomerate division's
product. A customer attracted by a balance of profit and losses may
temporarily benefit in price, but only until the smaller competitors are
driven from the market. The customer may then be faced with higher
prices as the conglomerate division exploits its monoplistic or oligopolistic
94. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 345 n.72 (1962); accord, United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370 (1963); United States v. Bethle-
hem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 616-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Scott Paper Co., 3 TRAD.
REG. REP. 16706, at 21636-37 (FTC 1964); Adams & Durlam, supra note 92, at 159-
62; New Economic Issues in Merger Enforcement, 24 A.B.A. ANTi-TRuST SEC. 113,
120-24 (1964). Of course, internal expansion may lead to oligopoly as weaker firms drop
out of the market. It has been contended that this is inevitable in most industries of a
modern economy. From an initial position of a group of many sellers, there is a steady de-
cline in the number of competitors "until a point of stability is reached with a handful
of massive survivors and, usually, a fringe of smaller hangers-on." GALBmrrU, op. cit.
supra note 92, at 33.
95. See text accompanying notes 8-9 supra.
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power. Thus these competitive methods resulting in internal expansion are
"socially disadvantageous"96 since they allow expansion at the expense of
competitors who seek to expand internally through improving product ef-
ficiency. 7
B. Concentration
The ultimate consequence of these socially disadvantageous methods is
further concentration of the market shares by firms in the acquired firm's
industry." This is an important consideration in any merger case, the
general fear being the development of an oligopoly which will allow the
creation of artifically high prices.99 Concentration is immediately furthered
in a horizontal merger, because one firm disappears from the market. In
a conglomerate-power merger, the process may be slower, but more deadly.
When conglomerate-power begins to develop, it drives small firms from the
market."' As this happens, the remaining firms move towards oligopoly.
Thus, the division connected with a conglomerate-power firm may be using
both conglomerate power and oligopolistic power.
Not only are existing small firms threatened, potential entrants into the
market, counted on to offset the normal rate of business failure, are dis-
couraged.1"' The threat of massive injection of conglomerate-power, po-
96. Procter & Gamble Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. % 16673, at 21585 (FTC 1963).
97. Id. at 21586. This characterization of "advantageous" or "disadvantagous," one
writer warns, demands a "value judgement as to which forms of rivalry are most bene-
ficial." Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74
HAv. L. REv. 226, 244 (1960). But one man's value judgement may be another's eco-
nomic analysis.
98. Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962); United States v.
FMC Corp., 218 F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Cal.) (preliminary injunction denied), appeal dis-
missed, 321 F.2d 534 (3d Cir.), aff'd, 84 Sup. Ct. 4 (1963) (Goldberg, J., opinon in
chamber); United States v. Lever Bros. Co., 216 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Up to
a certain point, of course, concentration in a given market will be beneficial, since econ-
omies of scale and opportunities of research are fostered. See Givens, Affirmative Bene-
fits of Industrial Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 26 IND. L.J. 51 (1960). The
point will necessarily be different for each industry, since each has its own econo-
mies of scale and research possibilities.
99. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 280 (1964); accord,
A. G. Spalding & Bros., Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 585, 617 (3d Cir. 1962); United States
v. Bethelehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 604 (1958); see 61 COLUM. L. REv. 629,
667 (1961).
100. See Clark, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 36 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 255, 273 (1961). A contrary view is given in Blair, The Conglomerate Mer-
ger in Economics and Law, 46 GEo. L.J. 672, 683-85 (1958). In Consolidated Foods
Corp. v. FTC, 329 F.2d 623 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 412 (1964) (No. 422),
it was noted that reciprocal buying could be more effectively used against small firms.
101. This is a consideration in any discusssion of concentration. See, e.g., United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 366-67 (1963); United States v. Bethle-
hem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); American Crystal Sugar Co.
v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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tentially greater than any threat which could be posed by concentration of
existing competition, makes conglomerate-power firms uniquely successful in
foreclosing access to potential entrants." ' Further, when a large firm
merges into a similar product area or into a new geographic area, it
terminates its status as a potential competitor who could have created a new
division or entered the market on its own.' Thus, what could have been
an infusion of new blood into the competitive structure of the market be-
comes a clog on it. Moreover, the firm's position as a potential competitor
may have operated to check any tendency among the existing firms toward
monopoly prices. 4 The increasing occurrence of conglomerate-power
mergers, with these forces of market concentration, was a major reason for
the "rising tide of economic concentration" described by the Supreme Court
as the inducement for the 1950 amendment to section 7.105
102. Procter & Gamble Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 16673, at 21570-71 (FTC 1963).
This potential use of conglomerate-power is of particular importance as the product line
approaches monopoly status, since a new entrant would face a firmly entrenched market
leader, able to use his monopolistic power as well as able to draw on conglomerate power.
Ekco Prods. Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 16879, at 21900-01 (FTC 1964); Procter &
Gamble, supra, at 21583.
103. Ekco Prods. Co., supra note 102, at 21907; Procter & Gamble Co., supra note
102; Foremost Dairies, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944, 1071-72, 1086-87, 1089 (FTC 1962);
Beatrice Foods Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 16831, at 21811 (FTC 1964) (initial de-
cision of hearing examiner).
104. Ekco Prods. Co., supra note 102, at 21900-01; Procter & Gamble Co., supra
note 102, at 21584; Foremost Dairies, Inc., supra note 103, at 1087.
In United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964), acquisition of a
firm which was a potential competitor in the respondent's geographic area was set aside
on the ground that this was elimination of a potential competitor. No exercise of conglo.
merate-power existed here. The merger was actually a market-extension merger, but the
Court was not concerned with competition in the acquired firm's geographic market. It
was instead concerned with competition in the acquiring firm's geographic market. See
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
105. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317-18, 345-46 (1962);
accord, United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., supra note 104, at 582. Whether there
was this "rising tide" is a matter of some dispute. From 1947 to 1954 the value added
by the 200 largest manufacturers rose from 30 to 37 per cent. STOCKING, WORKAZV
COMPETITION AND ANTI-TRUST POLICY 410 n.14 (1961); MERGERS AND SUPERCONCEN-
TRATION, supra note 34, at 13. On the other hand, it has been contended that reports
showing little increase in concentration were ignored by Senate groups seeking enactment
of the 1950 amendment, and that the major rise was delayed until the 1950s. Bok,
supra note 97, at 232. Some "natural" increase in concentration is inevitable as the
economy shifts from a decentralized agricultural basis to a relatively centralized industrial
basis. By the 1950s this trend was about complete. MASON, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION
AND THE MONOPOLY PROBLEM 24, 30-32 (1964). Probably because of growing markets
and availability of excess funds, concentration grows during periods of prosperity. The
first two large merger movements were in the 1900s and the 1920s; the country is now
in its third. This corresponds to the periods of peacetime prosperity in the twentieth
century. MERGERS AND SUPERCONCENTRATION, supra note 34, at 9-12.
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Basically, there are two reasons for congressional opposition to market
concentration. First is the economic reason that it leads to oligopoly or
monopoly with a consequent artificially higher level of prices."o Second is
the desire to perpetuate a system of small economic units in a decentralized
society for reasons unconnected with economic theory.'
The second basis of opposition is premised on the personal virtues sup-
posedly inculcated in the population as a result of a small-business system.'
There are indications that this basis may prevail even if the first basis reveals
that oligopoly may actually achieve the result ideally achieved by the com-
petitive model.'09 The Supreme Court has stated that: "Congress appre-
ciated that occasional higher costs and prices might result from the main-
tenance of fragmented industries and markets. It resolved these com-
peting considerations in favor of decentralization. We must give effect to
that decision."11 In the 1950 debates prior to the passage of the section 7
amendment, Congress thrust a political stick into the economic model; as
one observer said of the debates: "competition appeared to possess a strong
socio-political connotation which centered on the virtues of the small entre-
preneur to an extent seldom duplicated in economic literature.""'
106. See note I supra.
107. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 281 (1964); Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 316-18 (1962); John Wright & Associates v.
Ullrich, 328 F.2d 474, 480 (8th Cir. 1964). In the Aluminum Co., case it was stated
that "Rome [Cable Corporation] seems to us the prototype of the small independent that
Congress aimed to preserve by Section 7." 377 U.S. at 281. For criticism of this emphasis,
see Barnes, The Primacy of Competition and the Brown Shoe Decision, 51 GEo. L.J.
706, 740 (1963); Handier & Robinson, The Supreme Court v. Corporate Mergers, For-
tune, Jan. 1965, p. 164.
108. For example, see the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas in Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 318-19 (1949):
But beyond all that [effects on prices] there is the effect on the community when
independents are swallowed up by the trusts and the entrepreneurs become em-
ployees of absentee owners. Then there is a serious loss in citizenship. Local leader-
ship is diluted. He who was a leader in the village becomes dependent on outsiders
for his action and policy. Clerks responsible to a superior in a distant place take
the place of resident proprietors beholden to no one. These are the prices which
the nation pays for the almost ceaseless growth in bigness on the part of industry.
109. Crown Zellerbach Co. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 825 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 937 (1962). This seems to result from ignoring the notion of workable compe-
tition which "takes cognizance of the sadly overlooked point that over-all consequences,
which in theory are deplorable, are often in real life quite agreeable." GALBRAITr, Op.
cit. supra note 92, at 58.
110. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962); accord, United
States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530 (W.D.Pa. 1963), interlocutory injunc-
Lion aff'd, 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 168 F.
Supp. 576, 617-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); see Barnes, supra note 92, at 711.
111. Bok, supra note 97, at 236-37. The preoccupation with small business units
may be the result of current popular economic theory being based largely on conceptions
developed in the nineteenth century when small business units were by far the major
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In opposing concentration, Congress is not unmindful that much of the
threat to small business comes about because of the diversified firm. 12 In
light of modem business considerations, there are many compelling reasons
for a successful firm to diversify. Such a firm may spread risks, have access to
greater financial resources, enjoy increased stability, expand into new geo-
graphic or product areas without fear of unpredictable costs present in in-
ternal expansion, maintain a ready supply of raw materials to offset market
uncertainties and enjoy ready access to short-term and long-term credit. 3
It is no wonder that the FTC stated in 1963 that "many, perhaps most,
mergers involving substantial firms are conglomerate. 14 It is true, of course,
that a diversified firm may have resources, such as research facilities, which
may produce better products for the consumer in the acquired firm's
market.
But most of these advantages simply mean that existing divisions of the
conglomerate firm help carry burdens for the newly-acquired division.1 ' A
firm becoming a division of a diversified firm receives aid in its competitive
struggle. Or, put another way, it receives the benefit of conglomerate-power.
Thus, the recognition of conglomerate-power mergers as threats to competi-
tion places the anti-trust law as a roadblock, at least partially, to diversifi-
cation. So far this has been limited to rather blatant methods of competi-
part of the economy. Agriculture, the most obvious example of the competitive model,
was then the dominant sector of the economy. The description of the nineteenth cen-
tury, however, has become the goal of the twentieth century, or, stated another way,
"the preoccupation ceased to be with interpreting reality and came to be with building
a model economic society." GALRArrir, op. cit. supra note 92, at 16. Thus a theory as-
suming the existence of small business units is being applied to an economy with large
business units.
112. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317 (1962).
113. MERGERS AND SUPERCONCENTRATION, supra note 34, at 15; Dean, Business
Considerations-Why Merge?, 3 ANTi-TRuST BULL. 513 (1958); Hale, supra note 74, at
335-38; New Economic Issues in Merger Enforcement, supra note 94, at 119. For a dis-
cussion of the importance of insuring supplies in the steel industry, see United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 587, 612-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
114. Procter & Gamble Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1 16673, at 21567 (FTC 1963).
115. Facilities available for research to develop products for the newly-acquired firm
are largely made possible by retaining earnings from profits from existing products
(see note 78 supra). In a purely competitive model, profits retained from existing
products would have been lower, however, because of competition from other firms, or be-
cause of lowered prices or quality improvements in the product generating the profits, or
because of increased dividends to shareholders. A corporation which retains earnings
and uses them to finance diversification in effect substitutes the judgement of corporate
managers for the supposedly impersonal capital market in determining the allocation of
resources in the economy. Of course, the "impersonal" capital market may in turn
reduce itself to the sum total of personal decisions by investment officials and large in-
vestors. Paradoxically, the government encourages diversification by taxing capital gains
at a lower rate than dividends. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 301, 1201-02.
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tive harm. Nevertheless, as suggested in the conclusion, there lurks in the
competitive model a proposition which may provide a theoretical basis
for outlawing a large part, if not almost all parts, of the diversification
movement.
CONCLUSION
The essence of the concept of conglomerate-power is the transfer of
corporate resources from one division of a firm to another, or from one
market to another. In neither case does a product stand or fall in its
market on its own. In a conglomerate-power merger there is a gathering
under one financial roof of two or more disparate (either in product or
market) economic organizations with each ready to help the other. To the
extent that one does help the other, the other's ability to compete is
heightened. But its advantages do not come because it can gain customers
on its own, but rather from the aid it receives from another division of the
conglomerate." 6
Thus far the courts have recognized only blatantly overt methods of
transferring conglomerate-power from one division of a firm to another-
usually in cases in which the transferred advantage has been considered
"socially disadvantageous.""' 7 But the courts have recognized the business
reality that conglomerate-power is generally feasible only where there is a
significant disparity in size between the acquiring firm and the competitors
in the acquired firm's market."' It is only when the diversion of resources
116. In a diversified firm, the price of a given product may be pegged at cost or less,
the difference being subsidized by the other divisions. See EDWARDS, BIG BUSINESS
AND THE POLICY OF COMPETITION 11, 45 (1956); MILLER, THE MANAGERIAL PROBLEMS
OF DIVERSIFICATION 139-40 (1963). Unless there is careful cost-accounting, such sub-
sidies may unconsciously be made. ZINKE, THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 491-92 (1959).
117. In product-extension mergers, advertising and marketing resources to aid newly-
acquired products are shifted from established products; in market-extension mergers,
profits from an established market are used to allow price cuts in a newly-acquired
market and in reciprocal buying mergers, the cost of the regularly-bought product may
be higher as the coerced firm raises its prices to offset losses suffered by buying the co-
erced product (thus the coerced product is subsidized by the regularly-bought product).
Thus the courts have been willing to make the above analysis, but not the analysis in
note 115 supra. It is difficult to see, in view of the theory of the competitive model,
how the two differ. A possible reconciliation is that corporate diversification decisions
in note 115 situations may turn out to conform with consumer demands. When they
do not, the devices mentioned above may be used in an effort to achieve by socially
disadvantageous methods what could not be achieved by socially advantageous methods.
This is what the courts fear: but query whether such predictions can be made before
the fact. Hence the importance of post-acquisition evidence (see text at notes 48-49
supra). Will efforts to enforce the "impersonal" supply and demand economy lead to a
requirement for judicial approval of every diversification decision?
118. E.g., the following disparities in size have been noted between the conglomerate
firm and the acquired firm's market:
Conglomerate sales of over $1,000,000,000 and acquired firm's industry's maximun
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from one of the conglomerate's divisions causes a small amount of harm to
the yielding division but a great benefit to the benefiting division that con-
glomerate-power will be utilized.1 ' Otherwise, the conglomerate would be
merely robbing Peter to pay Paul. Thus conglomerate-power will be utilized
generally only to the detriment of small firms; in this sense the economic
analysis of conglomerate-power leads to a conclusion compatible with the
political objectives of Congress in protecting small business.
Paradoxically, the discovery of the potential harm from conglomerate-
power was delayed by virtue of an economic theory which apotheosizes the
role of small business. Traditionally, a fundamental assumption of the
competitive system has been that it is made up of relatively small sellers and
that each firm competes in each of its product-lines as if it is a one product
firm. No doubt this assumption stems from the traditional reality that most
firms were one-product firms, or that where there were multi-product firms,
there was no sophisticated use of conglomerate-power. At any rate, the
economic theory was based on the assumption that prices in a given market
were affected only by the activities of a firm in that product market. Even
the concept of "workable competition," considered a realistic recasting of
economic theory, emphasized the relationships of one-product firms. 1 0
sales of $40,000,000. Procter & Gamble Co., 3 TRADER uo. Rep. 16673, at 21568-69
(FTC, 1963).
Conglomerate assets of $60,000,000 and acquired firm having one.half of its market
with assets of $1,200,000. Consolidated Foods Corp., No. 7000, FTC, Nov. 15, 1962,
rev'd on other grounds, 329 F.2d 623 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 412 (1964)
(No. 422).
Conglomerate sales of $388,000,000, acquired firm's market ranged generally from
$225,000 to $4,000,000 in sales, with one having $48,000,000. Foremost Dairies, Inc.,
60 F.T.C. 944, 1049, 1064, 1066, 1069, 1085 (1962).
Conglomerate sales of $181,000,000, total sales in the three lines of commerce ac-
quired firms were engaged in were $10,000,000; $18,000,000; and $37,000,000. United
States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509, 518, 521-23 (3d Cir. 1961).
119. This is particularly possible when the yielding division itself is in an oligopolistic
industry with imperfect competition, where profit rates may be high, or where prices
can be raised slightly without losing a proportionate amount of sales. All rivals in an
oligopolistic industry, of course, may be each charging prices slightly higher than would
normally be charged in an industry which had many sellers. In this case, each would be
in a position to use the excess over market price to continually subsidize newly-acquired
small market firms.
120. This is the recognition that under certain conditions competition between a few
large firms may be more effective than that between a large number of small firms. See
DIRLA3 AND KAHN, FAIR COmPETrIION: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST
POLICY 3-17 (1954). It has been contended that this theory was developed in response
to recognition of de facto oligopoly in large segments of the economy. GALBRAITH, op.
cit. supra note 92, at 40; Givens, supra note 98, at 53; Walden, Anti-Trust in the Positive
State, 41 TEx. L. Rav. 741, 764-65 (1963).
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The success of an economic organization in each product-line (or market)
is supposedly gauged by the success of that product-line (or market); the
most efficient firms survive because they produce the most demanded
product. But a division of a conglomerate-power firm may survive even
when it produces an inferior product, because it receives benefits from other
divisions of the conglomerate. Only when an analysis of actual business
operations disclosed that conglomerate-power allowed a firm to do this was
the anti-competitive threat from diversified firms recognized. Once recog-
nized, it was a relatively simple step to point out that the use of con-
glomerate-power conflicted with the classical model. The gains from com-
petition in some product-lines or markets are used to benefit the con-
glomerate and harm competition in another product-line or market. Al-
though a diversified firm may find it advantageous to lessen profits in one
of its product-lines in order to gain advantages in a second, the harm to
competition in the second product-line, not the profits of the firm, is the
principal factor establishing a violation.
To a farsighted business executive, this use of conglomerate power may
be common sense, an opportunity to be seized. He is concerned not with
profits to be gained by a particular product, but the profits to be gained by
the firm. But when emphasis is shifted from profit from products to
profit for the firm, a major presupposition of the classical competitive theory
is removed; that the price of a product reflects its costs plus a profit. Con-
cern with the firm's profits can allow a loss on one product, while another
is gaining.
However, this means that there is no longer a correlation between firm
competition and product competition: the twin consequences of seller ad-
vantage and buyer advantage no longer exist. Because it benefits the seller
and not the buyer, conglomerate-power has been added to monopolistic
and oligopolistic power as a threat to competition. For a business practice
to conform to the competitive system which the courts are enforcing, it must
benefit both buyer and seller.
With the developing recognition that conglomerate-power may adversely
affect the competitive system and thus be a threat to competition, firms
seeking diversification through mergers'2 ' may find it as difficult to justify
their activities as many now do who seek expansion by acquiring competi-
tors.
121. The provision that Section 7 "shall not apply to corporations purchasing such
stock solely for investment" (Clayton Act, § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1941), as amended, 64
Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958)) does not validate a merger if it nonetheless
results in a substantial lessening of competition. United States v. E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589 (1957).
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